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Abstract: I model the participation of firms in a voluntary agreement as a costly certification 
process whereby a firm informs the Regulator of its pollution intensity. Without this knowledge, 
the Regulator imposes the same tax on all firms in a heterogeneous industry, unduly hurting the 
clean ones with the lowest intensity. Certification allows clean firms to get a tax rebate. It also 
entails an informational externality as the dispersion of types decreases within the pool of non-
participating firms, following an unraveling process. Because participation is a firm’s private 
decision, there is such a thing as a bad voluntary agreement. 
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Résumé: Je modélise la participation des entreprises à un accord volontaire comme un 
processus coûteux de certification suivant lequel une entreprise informe le Régulateur de 
l’intensité de sa pollution. Le Régulateur impose la même taxe pigouvienne à l’ensemble des 
entreprises de l’industrie dont il ignore l’intensité, en affectant inopinément les plus propres. La 
certification permet à ces dernières d’obtenir un congé de taxes. Elle génère en outre une 
externalité informationnelle puisque la disparité des différents types d’entreprise au sein des 
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Environmental regulation requires information. To adequately command or
incite firms to mitigate the impact of their production on the environment, a Reg-
ulator must learn about their technology. That learning phase is an integral part of
the regulation process even if it proceeds at a time when the firms are not actually
submitted to any regulation. Firms may welcome or lobby against a particular
regulation; in any event, they understand that once it is in place, they will have
to cope with it. It is at the time of its conception that they have more clout to
influence its design through their exchanges with the Regulator.
A voluntary agreement whereby the firms and the Regulator address an indus-
try wide externality is a valuable forum for these exchanges within the learning
phase alluded to above. In support of this view, Price and al. (2003, p.2) note that
Supporting programs and policies [...], such as entreprise audits,
assessments, benchmarking, monitoring, information dissemination,
and financial incentives all play an important role in assisting the
participants in meeting the target goals [of a voluntary agreement].
In this paper, I show that there is an inherent logic that compels firms to share
knowledge with the Regulator on a voluntary basis. To focus on the issue of infor-
mation, I consider an abstract idealization of a voluntary agreement: a certification
process whereby a firm informs the Regulator about its pollution intensity.
Participation in a voluntary agreement entails a loss in current profits but firms
may prefer a small reduction of profits today to avoid a larger one in the future
(Segerson and Miceli 1998). As for the Regulator, it might prefer the volun-
tary approach to traditional regulation because it economizes on transaction costs
(Lévêque 1999, Segerson and Miceli 1999).
Transaction costs account for any factor likely to impact the efficiency of the
regulatory process. For example, Schmelzer (1999) analyzes a case where firms
can observe each others’ emissions at a lower cost than the Regulator. The Regula-
tor then economizes on monitoring cost by delegating this function to the industry.
A voluntary agreement is then an economic way to regulate. But, it is not clear
that the industry can regulate itself at a lower cost. Contrary to the Regulator, the
industry must reconcile the conflicting incentives of individual firms (Ashby and
als, 2004; Dawson and Segerson, 2008).
In this paper, a firm participates to ensure a lighter regulation not for the in-
dustry but for itself. The Regulator fosters a voluntary agreement to gather in-
formation in the short-run while no coercive regulation is in place. My approach
combines transaction costs with incomplete information about the firms pollut-
ing intensities. Firms differ in their pollution intensity, but the Regulator cannot
perceive these different types. To reduce the emissions, the Regulator imposes
a uniform tax upon the firms’ outputs regardless of their types (the second-best
taxation scheme since a firm’s pollution intensity is not related to any of its other
observable attributes). Hence, the cleanest firms support a disproportionate share
of the tax burden. To avoid the impact of an undiscriminating regulation, clean
firms have an incentive to join a voluntary agreement and inform the Regulator
about their type.
Heyes (2005) makes a similar argument with abatement standards instead of
tax rates. More recently, Denicolò (2008) has shown that the early adoption of a
clean technology by a firm could be an informative signal to the Regulator that
it should be made mandatory for the whole industry. Both of these papers use
standard signaling games, in which the sender transfers only information about
himself. The analysis here goes quite a few steps further by noting that partici-
pation entails an informational externality as the statistical properties of the pool
of non-participating firms change. Given an expected uniform tax rate, only the
relatively clean firms participate so that the dispersion of types within the pool of
non-participating firms decreases. That externality is quite strong as it induces an
unraveling process that may lead all firms to willingly certify their type, eliminat-
ing the informational problem altogether.
The popularity of voluntary agreements has faltered over the years (Morgen-
stern et als., 2007). Voluntary agreements may result in little gain if we take
into account the transaction costs (Croci, 2005). I provide an explanation for this
phenomenon to the extent that the marginal social value of participation to the
agreement is endogenous. Participation is a private decision that the Regulator
does not always deem desirable. I show that, except in a quite particular case,
there is always a subset of participating firms whose contribution to social wel-
fare is lesser than it would be without a voluntary agreement. If these firms are
sufficiently numerous, instituting a voluntary agreement may actually lead to a
decrease in welfare.
I present the model in the next section. At first, I consider the case of costless
certification that yields full participation. I show how the voluntary agreement
model presented here is related to the literature on regulation under incomplete
information according to the timing at which the options to enforce a regulation
and to certify a firm’s technology become available. Since the argument about bad
voluntary agreements rests on transaction costs, I then consider the case of costly
certification in section 2 with a two-periods version of the model. In section 3, I
explain how the institution of a voluntary agreement could decrease social welfare.
I prove that it can happen with a numerical example in a mathematical appendix.
In this paper, the informational externality is “continuous” in the sense that the
participation of a small group of firms has a continuous effect on the Regulator’s
beliefs. This formalization is done for tractability, but I suspect that it does not
represent well all plausible cases. I discuss this issue in the conclusion.
1 First and Second Best Regulation
I model a competitive single-good market with a perfectly elastic demand at price
p and a population of firms with strictly positive, increasing and continuously
differentiable supply functions for all positive prices. Let s(p) denote a firm’s
supply. Its profit function pi (net of fixed costs) is strictly increasing and strictly
convex and, by Hotelling’s lemma, it has s for derivative.
A firm is defined by its profit function and its pollution intensity (damage per
unit produced) which I denote d. The intensities are distributed over an interval
D = [d0, d1], with positive measure over any subinterval. I assume that the price
p of the good is greater than d1 so that all firms have a positive, socially efficient
level of production.1
Let dˆ denote the expected pollution intensity conditional on being no less than
d. Hence, the expected intensity can be written dˆ0. I assume that this function is
increasing and continuous.2 There are positive measures of firms below and above
the mean so that
d0 < dˆ0 < d1.
Consider a firm (pi, d) whose supply s equals the industry’s average supply
among firms with a given pollution intensity d. I assume that the intensities d are
distributed independently of the firms’ other attributes (the profit functions) so that
dˆ0s(p) denotes the average damage in the industry. When the Regulator imposes
a unit tax t, the average supply decreases to s(p− t). Average profit decreases to
pi(p − t) but part of this reduction is the tax revenue T = ts(p − t) that has no
bearing on social surplus. On average, the social value of production of firms with
intensity d amounts to3
pi(p− t)− (d− t)s(p− t). (1)
If we decompose profits as revenues minus costs, the tax revenues cancel out so
that the production level determines the social value of production. But since sup-
ply strictly decreases with the tax rate, we can equivalently use either production
1To simplify the analysis, I discard consumer surplus. Assume that all production is exported
abroad.
2In the conclusion, I show that these are actually strong economic assumptions.
3In the rest of the paper, pi and s shall always refer to the average profit and supply functions
keeping constant the intensity level d.
or the tax rate as an instrument to maximize (1). Doing so with the tax rate, we
get the first-order condition4
(d− t∗)s′(p− t∗) = 0.
The optimal pigovian tax t∗ = d yields the first-best social value of production
pi(p− d). Let
S∗ = E(pi(p− d)) > 0
denote the first-best average social value of production under complete informa-
tion.
From the perspective of the Regulator, the environment is a credence good: the
real damage to the environment that results from the firms’ activities is a priori
unknown. For instance, the level of harmful emissions produced by the use of
a chemical may depend on the way a firm processes it, an information likely to
be known only by the firm itself. To impose a pigovian discriminatory tax on
a firm, the Regulator must know its pollution intensity. Since it is unrelated to
the observable variables, either supply or profits, there is no point in having a
discriminatory tax rate on either of these. Hence, without information about d,
the best the Regulator can do is to set a uniform tax t that maximizes the expected
social value of production
S(t) = pi(p− t)− (dˆ0 − t)s(p− t).
4The second order condition s′(p− t∗) > 0 is always satisfied.
The laissez-faire option is the special case where t = 0 and welfare amounts to
S(0). The second-best tax t∗∗ solves the first-order condition
(dˆ0 − t∗∗)s′(p− t∗∗) = 0,
so that the best uniform tax level equals the average intensity. With such a tax,
each firm pays the expected damages of its production
T ∗∗ = t∗∗s(p− t∗∗) = E(ds(p− t∗∗))
and the expected social value of production reaches
S(t∗∗) = pi(p− dˆ0).
Since t = t∗∗ is socially preferred to t = 0, welfare increases: S(t∗∗) > S(0).
Jensen’s inequality implies that
S∗ = E(pi(p− d)) > pi(p− dˆ0) = S(t∗∗).
To summarize: S∗ > S(t∗∗) > S(0). At the firm level, though,
d0 < dˆ0 < d1,
or equivalently
t∗(d0) < t∗∗ < t∗(d1).
The second-best tax is higher (lower) than the first-best tax for clean (dirty) firms.
As a consequence, clean (dirty) firms produce less (more) and make less (more)
profit with t∗∗ than they should
s(p− d0) > s(p− t∗∗) > s(p− d1),
pi(p− d0) > pi(p− t∗∗) > pi(p− d1).
The second-best tax improves social welfare with comparison to the laissez-
faire option but it is less efficient than the first-best scheme because it unduly con-
strains the production of relatively clean firms and it allows dirty firms to produce
more than they should.
1.1 The First-Best for Free
The Regulator lacks information about the pollution intensity but that information
is available from the firms themselves, although not all firms have an incentive
to provide it: those for which d > t∗∗ would pay a higher rate with an optimal
tax. But there is a solution to that problem: privatize the public bad so that an
overtaxed firm has an incentive to inform the Regulator of its lesser than average
pollution intensity.
Suppose the firms believe that the Regulator will set the uniform tax rate to
t1 = t
∗∗ = dˆ0.
All the clean firms whose polluting intensities are lesser than dˆ0 then have an
incentive to inform the Regulator that such a tax would unduly destroy social
welfare in their case.5 They would ask for discriminatory tax rebates t1−d so that
their effective tax rates would equal the first-best rates t∗(d) = d.
These private incentives generate an informational externality. If the firms
within the left portion of the distribution come forward, certify their type and ask
for a discriminating rate, the Regulator will learn that the conditional distribution
of intensity within the remaining population is bounded below by dˆ0 and it will
set a new uniform rate
t2 = tˆ1 =
ˆˆ
d0
for those firms. Since the conditional expectation of intensity within this subset
is higher than dˆ0, that uniform rate will be higher, t2 > t1, and all firms for
which t1 ≤ d < t2, that stayed silent in the first round will now come forward,
show compelling evidence about their type and also ask for a discriminating rate.
Again, the conditional expected intensity in the remaining population will shift to
5That the “cleanest” firms have an incentive to signal their type to the Regulator is in stark
contrast with the results of Heyes (2005) who considers standards of abatement instead of pigovian
taxes. There, a uniform average standard of abatement turns out to be uneconomical for the firms
that have a higher marginal cost of abatement, presumably the “dirtiest” ones. They are the ones
who benefit from a discriminatory, welfare-enhancing policy and who have an incentive to inform
the Regulator of their type.
the right and the Regulator will revise its rate to
t3 = tˆ2 =
ˆˆ
dˆ0.
Again, t3 > t2 > t1. This cascade effect stops when the tax rate reaches t = d1,
since d1 = dˆ1. At this point, all firms have willingly revealed their types and the
Regulator is able to implement the first-best pigovian tax scheme at no cost by
imposing a uniform tax rate t = d1 and offering each firm a discriminatory tax
rebate t− d.
This is an instance of Viscusi’s (1978) unraveling process in markets with in-
complete information. This process is quite powerful. Consider the simpler case
of a monopoly that sells a zero cost good to an heterogenous continuum of buy-
ers who may buy either one or zero unit. The buyers are differentiated by their
willingness to pay d in D. With no information about these valuations, the best
the monopoly can do is to set a single price within D since all buyers will buy at
the lowest posted price anyway. But with certification, the monopoly can screen
all buyers by selling at the maximum price d1 unless a buyer voluntarily certifies
their valuation: such a buyer would then get a personalized rebate that covers the
difference between d1 and their willingness to pay. With no certification cost, all
buyers would apply for a rebate and the monopoly would gather all the surplus in
the market. Now, if the idea of “certifying” one’s willingness to pay is dubious,
that of certifying a firm’s technology is routinely put into practice.
Back to the voluntary agreement model, we see that this result rests on two
assumptions:
1. The Coercion assumption: the Regulator can constrain the firms’ production
choices directly or with taxes.
2. The Certification assumption: firms can certify their type.
Without the Coercion assumption, the Regulator is pretty much emasculated;
without the Certification assumption, it would have to rely on soft (non-verifiable)
information of dubious quality since all firms would state that they have the lowest
possible intensity in order to get the highest possible rebate.
Both assumptions make sense in the long-run since the Regulator channels
vast powers and information diffusion is an increasing-return technology (the
more people know something, the easier for someone else to learn it). In that
sense, the regulation problem is acute in the short-run when either one of these
assumptions does not hold.6 Within a given timeframe, it is sufficient that the
Coercion assumption will eventually hold to ensure that the regulatory process
has some bite (Segerson and Miceli 1998). The only question is whether it holds
before or after the Certification assumption.
The traditional literature on regulation under incomplete information assumes
that the Coercion assumption holds before the Certification assumption (the pos-
sibility of certification is assumed away). To rationalize the recourse to volun-
tary agreements, I shall assume the opposite: In the next section, I develop a
6Regulation is not “free” in the long-run to the extent that new information asymmetries con-
tinuously emerge.
two-periods version of the model where the the Certification assumption holds
sooner than the Coercion assumption, within the very specific setting of a volun-
tary agreement.
2 A Rationale For Voluntary Agreements
Consider a two-periods horizon with no discounting.7 The Regulator can constrain
the firms’ production choices with taxes only in the second period. As before, a
firm’s type (its pollution intensity) is private information but signalling that type
is now costly. Without a voluntary agreement, the firms produce and pollute at
will in the first period and the uninformed Regulator imposes the second-best
uniform tax in the second period. The social surplus amounts to the benchmark
level S(0) + S(t∗∗).
A voluntary agreement is more than just a slogan as it needs human resources
to work.8 In this paper, I define a voluntary agreement as the most economical
institutional arrangement through which the firms can communicate information
to the Regulator in the short-run. I idealize it as a certification process (a perfect
audit) of a firm’s type that costs c > 0 (a deadweight loss) per unit produced.9
Once certified, a firm’s type becomes common knowledge. As in the previous
7I discard discounting to simplify the analysis but there is little point to introduce it anyway
unless one assumes that the lengths of the two-periods (short and medium terms) are the same.
8In the Danish agreement scheme on industrial energy efficiency, where participating firms
enjoyed a lower tax rate, the cost involved amounted up to 330,000¤ per firm. Those of the
Project XL in the United States were of the same magnitude (OECD, 2003).
9This makes the certification cost a variable cost although it should have a fixed cost interpre-
tation. I do this for tractability; in particular, this is an easy way to relate the certification cost to
the firm’s size. This assumption does not affect the results in a significant way.
section, a certified firm gets a tax rebate in the second period.
2.1 The Regulator’s Problem
The Regulator sets the tax rates once it has the power to do so: at the beginning
of the second period. I assume that it then maximizes expected welfare condi-
tional on the information gathered during the voluntary agreement: it offers the
first-best discriminatory rate to each certified firm (equal to their type) and the
second-best uniform rate to the others, computed for that pool of firms. Hence, it
cannot commit himself in the first period to set a high uniform tax to induce more
participation (if the firms did not respond and it learned little, it would have an
incentive to lower that rate). I specify this to emphasize the idea that the informa-
tion brought by a voluntary agreement is too valuable to commit ex ante to discard
it ex post (see the discussion in the conclusion).
The institution of a voluntary agreement is not a strategic variable here. I
simply compare the levels of social welfare achieved with and without it. On the
other hand, the private decisions of firms to participate or not is an essential part
of the argument.
2.2 Participation
Suppose the firms expect the second period uniform rate to be t. A firm partici-
pates in the voluntary agreement if the long-run benefit pi(p − d) − pi(p − t) of
getting a tax rebate t− d covers the short-run opportunity cost pi(p)− pi(p− c) of
certification. The gain in participating (the difference) is denoted V (d, t).
V (d, t) = pi(p− d)− pi(p− t)− (pi(p)− pi(p− c)).
Notice that V is convex, decreasing in d and increasing in t. A firm with pollution
intensity d that expects a second period uniform rate t participates if V (d, t) ≥ 0.
To maintain a simple information structure, I assume thereafter that all profit
functions are identical up to an affine transformation. In the previous section, we
had c = 0 so that the participation condition resumed to d ≤ t. Hence, partici-
pation depended on d but not on pi and did not affect the statistical independence
property between d and pi. This is no longer the case so that, theoretically, par-
ticipation could cause observable profits (or supply) and pollution intensity to
be somewhat correlated. It wouldn’t be certain that a uniform tax, independent
of pi, would necessarily yield the second-best welfare within the pool of non-
participating firms. But if all profit functions are identical to some function pi up
to an affine transformation, then they will share the same participation function V
up to such transformation as well and their decisions to participate will differ, as
before, only if their types differ.
The certification cost must not be too high so that the cleanest firm wishes to
participate. Hence, I assume that
V (d0, t
∗∗) > 0. (2)
Since V increases with t, this inequality holds as well for any higher tax rate. Be-
sides, the dirtiest firm d1 will never want to pay for certification since the uniform
rate is bounded above by its type: it cannot expect to get a tax rebate by getting
certified. This implies that V (d1, t) < 0. To resume,
V (d0, t) > 0 > V (d1, t) for all t ∈ [t∗∗, d1]. (3)
By continuity, there exists a firm δ(t) that is indifferent about participating or not;
i.e. for which V (δ(t), t) = 0. Using the implicit function theorem, we verify that
a higher expected tax incite more firms to participate; that is, δ strictly increases
with t. It follows that all firms such that d ≤ δ(t) participate.10 A firm dirtier than
the marginal firm δ(t) does not participate. For the marginal firm
pi(p− δ(t))− pi(p− t) = pi(p)− pi(p− c) > 0,
so that δ(t) < t. Increasing d slightly, we find a bunch of non-participating firms
for which pi(p− d) > pi(p− t); that is, firms that would benefit in the long-run by
participating yet choose to abstain to economize on the certification cost.
2.3 Existence of an Equilibrium
In a rational expectations equilibrium, the expected tax rate te induces a par-
ticipation δ(te) such that the second-best uniform rate within the pool of non-
participating firms is δˆ(te) = te.
10Although δ(t) bounds the subset of participating firms, it says nothing about its size which
depends on the distribution of types within the population.
Since V decreases with d, the l.h.s. of condition (3) ensures that δ(t∗∗) > d0
so that δˆ(t∗∗) > dˆ0 = t∗∗. The function δˆ is a composition of two increasing
functions on D; so it is increasing as well and, by Tarski’s theorem, it has a fixed
point te that denotes both the equilibrium expected and the realized value of the
uniform rate. If te = t∗∗, we get the contradiction t∗∗ = δˆ(t∗∗). It follows that
δˆ(te) = te > t
∗∗. For further reference, I denote de = δ(te) the marginal firm at
the equilibrium point.
The existence of an equilibrium is depicted in Figure 1. The space is D2:
the horizontal axis represents the pollution intensity d and the vertical axis, the
tax rate t. Two strictly increasing continuous functions are drawn. The function
dˆ maps each intensity level onto a revised tax rate. In particular, dˆ0 = t∗∗ and
dˆ1 = d1. The function δ maps tax rate into a marginal firm that bounds above the
set of participating firms. It is undefined around d0 since no firm would agree to
pay the certification cost to avoid such a low rate. It is always below t because
only firms with d < t will eventually want to participate. Yet δ(t∗∗) exists and is
strictly positive since we have assumed that the certification cost is low enough so
that type d0 has a strict interest in participating. This implies that δ crosses the t-
axis below t∗∗. At the other end ofD, δ(t) < t implies that δ(d1) < d1. These two
facts imply the existence of an equilibrium point, such as point z, where the two
functions cross. There, each function yields the inverse of the other: δˆ(te) = te.
xy
dd1
t
d0
d0 δ(t
∗∗)
t∗∗
dˆ
dˆ0 de = δ(te)
te = dˆe
δ(t)
de
d1
dxe
z
Figure 1: Equilibria.
2.4 Multiple Equilibria and Stability
Instances of multiple equilibria are possible. Recall that the higher the expected
rate, the greater the participation. In equilibrium z, we have de > t∗∗. By this
criteria, I shall refer to z as a high-participation equilibrium. By contrast, an
equilibrium like x, where dxe < t
∗∗, is a low-participation equilibrium (I use this
characterization later).
The function δ does not depend on the distribution of types in any way. By
contrast, the conditional expectation function dˆ depends only on the distribution of
types. So both curves are independent: given δ, we are free to draw any increasing
function dˆ that starts at point (d0, t∗∗) and ends at point (d1, d1). As we consider
different distributions, the equilibrium points are anywhere along δ within the
points a and b. Stated differently, given any tax rate t ∈ (t∗∗, d1), there exists
a distribution of types such that te = t and de = δ(t). Likewise, given any
participation level d between δ(t∗∗) and δ(d1), there exists a distribution of types
such that de = d and te = dˆ.
Multiple equilibria generically come in odd numbers as is the case in the fig-
ure. There are three equilibria in x, y and z where x and z are respectively the
low and high equilibria I just described. Both are stable in the sense that if some
firms expect a marginal discrepancy between the actual and equilibrium tax rates,
their reaction will lead the Regulator to revise the rate by a lesser amount than
this discrepancy. For instance, if the firms expect t to be te − ∆1, participation
will decrease to δ(te − ∆1). But this should lead the Regulator to lower t by
∆2 = te − δˆ(te − ∆1) which is less than ∆1. Iterating on this reasoning, we see
that ∆n → 0. The equilibrium y is unstable: any discrepancy between the firms’
expectations about the tax rate and its equilibrium value will lead to an ever in-
creasing or decreasing revision process until the expectations converge again to a
new stable equilibrium.
3 Welfare Analysis
As the certification cost decreases, all firms eventually participate and welfare
rises from S(0)+S(t∗∗) to 2S∗. So a voluntary agreement enhances welfare if the
certification cost is sufficiently low. The logically remaining questions are: given
a positive certification cost, when does the institution of a voluntary agreement
increases welfare? and can it reduce welfare?
With certification, the total social contribution to welfare of non-participating
firms always increases because, as the uniform tax rises, it gets closer on average
to the marginal damage from their production.11 It follows that if the institution
of a voluntary agreement leads to a decrease of welfare, it is because the private
benefit of certification for some firms is greater than its private cost, and lower
than its social cost as I will show below. In that sense, a bad voluntary agreement
involves too much participation. In addition, these firms must be sufficiently nu-
merous so that their drag on social welfare overcomes the gains realized by the
other firms. With a numerical example (in a mathematical appendix), I show that
there exists such a thing as a bad voluntary agreement.
11That raise worsens the distortion for the cleanest ones among them, but their total contribution
as a group necessarily rises.
In the rest of this section, I provide a partial characterization of good and bad
voluntary agreements. It is partial because the outcome of a voluntary agreement
depends on the distribution of types upon which I have laid out very few assump-
tions. Nevertheless, a lot can be inferred from the behavior of the cleanest firm. To
get this characterization, I need two additional regularity assumptions about the
supply function: (i) that it is concave and (ii) that the dirtier the firm, the higher
its efficient level of total pollution ds(p− d).12
Notwithstanding its effect on the information structure, participation entails
two external effects that matter for the Regulator. A participating firm reduces its
production by s(p)− s(p− c) in the short-run and that brings an additional social
benefit as pollution is proportionally reduced. In the long-run, the firm is taxed
efficiently and the Regulator avoids the external social loss (d− t∗∗)s(p− t∗∗)
induced by the second-best uniform tax rate. Let
W (d) = d(s(p)− s(p− c)) + (d− t∗∗)s(p− t∗∗),
an increasing affine function, resume these external effects.
A voluntary agreement increases a participating firm’s contribution to social
welfare if
V (d, te) +W (d) ≥ pi(p− t∗∗)− pi(p− te). (4)
The positive term on the r.h.s. is an adjustment to take into account that the Reg-
12These non-parametric restrictions on the technology may look obscure: Together, they imply
that the dirtiest firm should not have to reduce its production by more than a half to be efficient.
ulator considers the benefit of participation in comparison to the base scenario,
with no voluntary agreement, while each individual firm considers the benefit of
participating given that such an opportunity exists and that the uniform tax rate is
expected to rise up to te. 13
Notice that the function V +W is a convex function of d. Notwithstanding the
distribution of types, a voluntary agreement increases welfare when (4) holds at
the minimum of V +W over the subset [d0, de] of participating firms. Otherwise,
there exists a positive measure of types around the point that minimizes V +
W for which (4) does not hold. Again, if these types weigh sufficiently in the
distribution, welfare will decrease.
The minimum of V + W could be at either of the boundary points d0 and de,
or at an interior point d∗ where its partial derivative is null. The partial derivative
of V +W with respect to d
s(p) + s(p− t∗∗)− s(p− c)− s(p− d) (5)
amounts to the total reduction of production of a participating firm over the two-
periods horizon.
Suppose V + W reaches its minimum at d0. This implies that (5) is positive
13Equation (4) is a rearrangement of the condition
pi(p− c)− ds(p− c) + pi(p− d) ≥ pi(p)− ds(p) + pi(p− t∗∗)− (d− t∗∗)s(p− t∗∗)
that contrasts a firm’s social contribution to welfare if it participates to the voluntary agreement
(on the l.h.s.) to its contribution when no such agreement exists (on the r.h.s.). That inequality is
independent of the equilibrium uniform tax rate. I subtract the term pi(p− te) on both sides to get
(4).
at d0 (the cleanest firm decreases its production). If, in addition, its social contri-
bution to welfare increases; that is if (4) holds for type d0, then it holds as well
for all the other participating types to its right. Then a voluntary agreement unam-
biguously increases welfare. On the other hand, if (4) does not holds for type d0,
then it does not hold either for a subset of participating types to its right. Then a
voluntary agreement could decrease welfare if this subset weights sufficiently in
the distribution. In the two remaining cases, that of an interior minimum at d∗ and
that of a minimum at de, I show that (4) does not hold either for a subset of firms.
If the minimum is interior, there is a participating firm d∗ that simply reallo-
cates its production in time
s(p) + s(p− t∗∗) = s(p− c) + s(p− d∗). (6)
Since it now produces less in the first period, it must be producing more in the
second period. Hence s(p − d∗) > s(p − t∗∗) which implies that certification
provides this firm a tax rebate t∗∗ − d∗ > 0. Again, so as to keep total production
constant, s(p − d∗) < s(p) implies that s(p − c) > s(p − t∗∗), so that t∗∗ > c.
Finally, the concave assumption (i) above implies that the tax rebate is lesser than
the certification cost: t∗∗ − d∗ < c (see the second appendix).
Now consider this property of convex functions: If pi is strictly convex, a > b
and 0 < x < a− b, then14
pi(a) + pi(b) > pi(a− x) + pi(b+ x).
14The inequality is reversed if x > a− b.
Set a = p, b = p− t∗∗ and x = c, so that a− b = t∗∗ > c = x, to get
pi(p) + pi(p− t∗∗) > pi(p− c) + pi(p− t∗∗ + c),
and since −t∗∗ + c > −d∗, that
pi(p) + pi(p− t∗∗) > pi(p− c) + pi(p− d∗),
or equivalently that
V (d∗, te) < pi(p− t∗∗)− pi(p− te). (7)
Using (6), we have
W (d∗) = d∗s(p− d∗)− t∗∗s(p− t∗∗).
Because a dirtier firm should pollute more (assumption ii above) and t∗∗ > d∗,
then
W (d∗) < 0. (8)
It follows from (7) and (8) that (4) does not hold at d∗ nor over a subset of types
around that value.
Lastly, if the minimum is at de, the derivative (5) is negative at de (the marginal
firm increases its production) so that
s(p) + s(p− t∗∗) < s(p− c) + s(p− de). (9)
This inequality implies that t∗∗ > de (the marginal firm gets a tax rebate). Multiply
by de and subtract T ∗∗ on both sides to get
W (de) < des(p− de)− t∗∗s(p− t∗∗).
Again, because a dirtier firm should pollute more (assumption ii above), the r.h.s.
is negative so that W (de) is negative as well. By definition, V (de) = 0 so that (4)
does not hold at de. Thus, there is a subset of types to the left of de over which (4)
does not hold either.
Notice that (9) cannot hold in a high-participation equilibrium. In such equi-
librium, the uniform tax rate rises so much that the marginal firm is compelled to
participate although it pays a higher tax and produces less in the end. With a zero
certification cost, as in section 1, this is exactly what happens to the dirtiest firm.
4 Conclusion
From the firm’s point a view, certification is an option to reallocate its production
in time: a good reallocation involves a small reduction in current production (be-
cause of the certification cost) and a large expansion of future production; a dirty
firm cannot expect a good reallocation and will not participate. From the Regula-
tor’s point of view, such a reallocation makes sense for the cleanest firms but not
for the others. In particular, there is no gain in certifying a type d = t∗∗ firm in
the middle since it is already taxed at the first-best level. A voluntary agreement
works as a deal between the cleanest firms and the Regulator.
However, the Regulator does not control entry so that, although the cleanest
firms always participate, other parasitistic firms are drawn in as well. These firms
waste the cost of certification to get a tax rebate without increasing social welfare
since their total production does not change much. Only when the cleanest firms
do contribute more by decreasing their total production can we be sure that cer-
tification will improve the contributions of all other participating firms; and that,
because only then will we be sure that the latter will decrease their total production
as well.
In this model, certification can only take place in the first period within the
very specific setting of a voluntary agreement. Certification is the voluntary agree-
ment: it stands for a sophisticated information-transmission mechanism that goes
on within a voluntary agreement. Meetings, exchange of documents, on site con-
trols, etc, by civil servants, and participating firms’ employees result in the Regu-
lator being informed, at a cost, about the firms’ technology. Obviously, informa-
tion about firms can come from other sources and at other moments in time, but
the point is that proceeding early on a voluntary basis makes sense if the trans-
action costs are low. Allowing the firms to get certified at various points in time
would obviously enrich the model (at the cost of getting more complex) and could
provide insights on the issue of participation when there are multiple equilibria.
The Regulator may want to influence participation if the firms did not coordinate
themselves on the best equilibrium in the first place.
Assuming that a voluntary agreement would enhance welfare, one way to do
so would be for the Regulator to commit in advance to impose the (best) equi-
librium uniform tax rate. Yet, the information structure does not always allows
the Regulator to compute ex ante (as I do) the equilibrium second-best rate. Re-
member that I have assumed that the conditional expected intensity among the
pool of non-participating firms was increasing and continuous as the marginal in-
tensity (the type of the marginal firm) rises. These are strong assumptions as the
following simple example will demonstrate.
Compare the following two cases. In the first case, the pollution intensity
is distributed uniformly over [0, 1] so that t∗∗ = 1
2
. If the cleanest firms within
[0,∆], where ∆ is a small number, choose to participate, the ex post rate would
rise marginally by ∆
2
and that would motivate other firms to participate. In the sec-
ond case, it is common knowledge that the distribution of firms is either F (d) =
d(2 − d) or G(d) = d2 with equal probabilities. From an ex ante point of view,
firms are distributed according to 1
2
F (d)+ 1
2
G(d) = d which is the uniform distri-
bution. Since the ex ante distribution is the same as in the first case, t∗∗ still equals
1
2
, but if the firms within [0,∆] participate, the Regulator will immediately learn
which of F or G is the true distribution. If it’s F , the ex post tax will plunge to
1
3
+ 2
3
∆; and if it is G, it will jump to 2
3
+ 2
3
∆2
∆+1
. In the second case, the condi-
tional expectation does not change continuously as participation increases and it
is not even “increasing” or “decreasing” in a meaningful way. The informational
externality here has a discontinuous effect on the Regulator’s beliefs. The point
is that it would make little sense for the Regulator to commit ex ante to a second
period tax rate. But the logic of certification remains unaltered: clean firms have
a keen interest in coming forward and informing the Regulator about their type.
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Numerical example
The following numerical example describes instances of low and high-participation
equilibria where social welfare is lower than the level reached without a voluntary
agreement. All the firms have the same profit function pi(p) = p2/2, so that supply
is a linear function of price s(p) = p. Set p = 4 and distribute d uniformly over
[0, 4], so that t∗∗ = 2. If a firm is taxed at rate t, it produces 4− t and contributes
pi(p− t)− (d− t)s(p− t) = 4− t
2
(4 + t− 2d)
to social welfare. Under the first-best scheme (t = d ), it produces 4 − d and
contributes (4 − d)2/2. With second-best taxation (t = 2), it produces 2 and
contributes 2(3−d). When unregulated (t = 0), it overproduces 4 and contributes
4(2− d).
Aggregated social welfare sums the contributions of each quartile of the pop-
ulation. For the three regimes, we get15
S∗ =
∫ 4
0
(4− s)2
2
ds = 6.16 + 3.16 + 1.16 + 0.16 = 10.6,
S(t∗∗) =
∫ 4
0
2 (3− s) ds = 5 + 3 + 1− 1 = 8,
S(0) =
∫ 4
0
4 (2− s) ds = 6 + 2− 2− 6 = 0.
Second best taxation improves the contributions of the second and third quartiles
and reduces the social loss brought by the dirtiest firms, but at the expense of
reducing the social contribution of the cleanest firms of the first quartile.
The private benefit to participate is
2V (d, t) = (4− d)2 − (4− t)2 + (4− c)2 − 16.
Condition (2) commands that c < 2. Set V (δ(t), t) = 0 to obtain the measure of
participation δ(t)
4− δ(t) =
√
(4− t)2 − (4− c)2 + 16 (10)
With participation δ(t), the second period rate rises from 2 to
δˆ(t) =
∫ 4
δ(t)
s
4− δ(t)ds =
4 + δ(t)
2
.
15Since the density is constant, I discard it in all computations. All reported aggregated payoffs
are thus multiplied by 4.
Use (10) and the equilibrium condition δˆ(te) = te to compute the equilibrium tax
rate
4− te =
√
16− (4− c)2
3
. (11)
The equilibrium reluctant firm is de = δ(te). Plug back the equilibrium values
into (10), and notice that
(4− c)2 = 16− 3
4
(4− de)2. (12)
In the first period, a participating firm contributes
pi(p− c)− ds(p− c) = 4− c
2
(4− c− 2d).
In the second period, it efficiently contributes (4− d)2/2. The total welfare from
participating firms amounts to
∫ de
0
1
2
[
(4− c)2 − (4− c)2d+ (4− d)2] dδ,
=
de
2
[
(4− c)2 + cde + 13 d2e − 8de + 16
]
,
=
de
2
[
cde − 512 d2e − 2de + 20
]
. (13)
(Use (12) in the last step to get rid of (4− c)2.)
A non-participating firm generates 4(2− d) in the first period and
4− te
2
(4 + te − 2d)
in the second period. Substitute te = (4 + de)/2 and integrate to get the total
welfare from non-participating firms
∫ 4
de
1
8
[32(2− s) + (4− d)(12 + d− 4s)] ds = 8− de
2
[
1
4
d2e − 7de + 28
]
. (14)
Total welfare with a voluntary agreement is the sum of (13) and (14) :
8 +
d2e
2
(c−m(de)), (15)
wherem(δ) = 2
3
δ−5+ 8
δ
. Re-parameterize the verification cost with a decreasing
transformation on D:
c(δ) = 4−
√
16− 3(4− δ)
2
4
, (16)
so that de = δ (the condition c(δ) < 2 implies that δ > 0 while c(4) = 0).
This family of models is now indexed by a participation parameter δ instead of
a certification cost c. Put differently, to get a participation of δ, we need to set a
certification cost equal to c(δ). Substitute (16) for c in (15)
8 +
δ2
2
(c(δ)−m(δ)) . (17)
With no voluntary agreement, the Regulator achieves
S(0) + S(t∗∗) = 8.
Comparing this expression with (17), we see that the institution of a voluntary
agreement decreases social welfare when c(δ) < m(δ). This happens in any low-
participation equilibrium (when δ < 2 = t∗∗). Since c(2) = 4−√15 < m(2) = 1
3
,
it also happens for some high-participation equilibria.
A.2 A participating firm that does not change its total production
gets a tax rebate bounded by the certification cost
Equation (6) implies t∗∗ > c and t∗∗ > d. Here I show that it also implies
t∗∗ − d∗ < c. Suppose that c ≤ d∗. Since we have assume in i) that the sup-
ply function is concave, −s is convex and we can apply the convexity property
presented in the following paragraph of the text with a = p, b = p− t∗∗ and x = c
(so that x = c < t∗∗ = a− b) to get
s(p− c) + s(p− t∗∗ + c) > s(p) + s(p− t∗∗).
Compare this expression with (6) to conclude that t∗∗ − d∗ < c. If c > d∗, set
x = d∗ and run the same argument.
